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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Whether it was cocaine or "crack" is the principal 
sentencing issue in this appeal. The district judge found it 
was "crack." 
 
In June 1992, defendant-appellant Holman entered an 
open guilty plea to a count charging a conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, to another 
count charging possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 
and to three counts of using a telephone to facilitate a drug 
felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846, 841(a)(1) and 843. 
His drug activities were in and around the Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania area. He was sentenced to 188 months of 
imprisonment followed by a term of five years of supervised 
release. He did not appeal. 
 
In 1995, Holman filed a motion to vacate or correct his 
1992 sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. The district 
court denied Holman's motion. This time he appealed. In 
March 1996, this court remanded the case for 
reconsideration of an issue not involved in the present 
appeal. The district court thereafter, in May 1996, reduced 
Holman's sentence from 188 months to 145 months to be 
followed by supervised release. Again Holman did not 
appeal, but in December 1996 he filed a pro se motion to 
vacate or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
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S 2255. The district court denied his latest motion as a 
second or successive motion, and Holman appealed. In 
December 1997, this court reversed the district court's 
holding and remanded the case directing the sentencing 
court to determine whether the government had proven 
that the cocaine seized from Holman was in fact "crack" 
and also to consider whether Holman was entitled to a 
third level sentence reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. 
 
In February 1998, the district court held a hearing for 
those purposes and determined that the cocaine was indeed 
"crack." After the hearing, the district court reduced 
Holman's sentence to 135 months to be followed by 
supervised release. In April 1998, Holman filed this appeal 
in which he argues that the government failed to prove at 
the sentencing hearing that a substantial portion of 
Holman's drugs was "crack." Holman also raises additional 
sentence calculation issues including whether he is entitled 
to a decrease in his offense level for a mitigating role in the 
offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2; whether he is entitled 
to a decrease in his offense level under the "safety valve" 
provision, U.S.S.G. S 5C1.2; and whether he is entitled to a 
decrease in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 
for allegedly providing the government with substantial 
evidence in the investigation and prosecution of others. 
 
So far Holman has, by his persistence, secured over four 




Whether Holman's cocaine was in substantial part 
cocaine base known as "crack," as the government claims, 
makes a considerable difference in his sentence. "Given the 
highly severe sentencing ratio of 100:1 for crack versus 
cocaine . . . a sentence may vary dramatically depending on 
whether he sold crack or cocaine." United States v. James, 
78 F.3d 851, 856 (3rd Cir. 1996). The reason for this 
"dramatic" sentencing enhancement was explained in 
United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 1995). "In 
1986, Congress was concerned about the emergence of a 
new, smokable form of cocaine that was more dangerous 
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than powder cocaine, less expensive, and highly addictive." 
Id. at 493. So, in 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act, which established enhanced sentences for 
offenses involving "cocaine base." In 1993, Congress 
amended Guideline S 2D1.1 to explain that"cocaine base," 
for the purposes of that guideline, meant "crack." " `Crack' " 
it was noted, "is the street name for a form of cocaine base, 
usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and 
sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy 
rocklike form." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1. 
 
At Holman's "crack" sentencing hearings held in 
February and March 1998, the district court determined 
that 90.253 grams of cocaine base found in Holman's 
apartment were "crack" and correspondingly set Holman's 
base offense level at 34. Also included in that offense level 
determination was an additional 621.3 grams of cocaine, 
not "crack," possessed by Holman and stashed in a rented 
locker. The government did not argue that the cocaine in 
the locker was "crack," and its ownership is not disputed. 
 
We must examine the government's evidence to see if it 
meets the burden of showing that a substantial portion of 
the drugs seized in Holman's apartment was "crack" as 
defined in the Sentencing Guidelines. For sentencing 
purposes, the character of the drug substance need not be 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a 
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Roman, 121 
F.3d 136, 141 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 
(1998). Roman makes plain, however, citing United States v. 
Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995), that the lesser 
burden of proof requires more than lip service. To carry its 
burden, the government must present " `reliable and 
specific evidence' " that the substance in question is 
"crack." Roman, 121 F.3d at 141 (quoting Lawrence, 47 
F.3d at 1566). It is the serious duty of the district court to 
hold the government to this burden particularly because of 
the impact the identity determination has on sentencing. 
That responsibility can come as no surprise to the 
government as this court in Roman expressed its concern 
with the government's efforts in that case to prove the drug 
substance involved was "crack." Id. at 141 n.4. The "crack" 
evidence in Roman was found to be sufficient, "but just 
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barely." Id. at 140. The only crack evidence in Roman was 
the opinion testimony of a drug enforcement officer, not a 
chemist, but with years of experience, however, as a police 
officer. He testified that the drugs seized were packaged in 
"clear plastic vials with color caps" which he described as 
the way "crack" is commonly packaged on the streets of 
Philadelphia, the location of that arrest. Id. at 141. Based 
on this information, the testifying officer concluded that 
what he had seized was "crack cocaine." Id. 
 
In the present case, at the March 1998 sentencing 
hearing, the government called three witnesses, all 
vigorously cross-examined. The first was Corporal 
Donahue, the supervisor of the chemical laboratory for the 
Philadelphia Police Department. Corporal Donahue 
produced the record of the chemical analysis done on 
Holman's drugs in 1991. The report showed who the 
chemist had been, the weights of the drugs, and the result 
of the analysis of two drug items. The drugs themselves 
seized at Holman's apartment in 1991, however, had been 
destroyed in 1994 according to police protocol and 
pursuant to an order of a local court. One of the two items 
as shown on the chemist's report was found to be cocaine 
base and the second item was described only as cocaine. 
The Corporal explained that the chemist's report referred to 
cocaine base rather than "crack" as the latter term is not 
generally used in the laboratory to further identify cocaine 
base. 
 
The government next called Detective Clements, an 
employee of the local district attorney's office. He had 
served for eight years as a member of the Dangerous Drug 
Offenders Unit and as a member of the Philadelphia Police 
Department for eighteen years prior to that. Detective 
Clements had participated in the 1991 search of Holman's 
apartment and the seizure of the drugs. He explained that 
he seized four clear plastic bags containing an off-white- 
beige substance and an additional three clear plastic bags 
containing a white powder substance. These bags were 
found in the pockets of clothing in a closet in Holman's 
apartment. Detective Clements further testified that the off- 
white-beige substance appeared to be "crack" cocaine. He 
explained he was familiar with "crack" cocaine based on his 
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experience in the police department for as part of his duties 
he had purchased "crack" numerous times, seized it in the 
execution of search warrants, and had been with other 
officers when they had purchased and seized "crack." 
 
Officer Clements described the differences in the 
appearances of the two items of seized narcotics. The 
substance designated as Item 1, he said, was harder and 
off-color when compared with the cocaine in Item 2 which 
he described as a powdery substance, lighter in color. The 
same appearance distinctions were revealed on the police 
property receipt for Holman's seized drugs which the officer 
provided. When seized, he explained, the substances had 
been kept in separate bags. Officer Clements, on cross- 
examination, conceded that his "crack" opinion was based 
on his experience and the appearance of the substances, 
although he could not be 100% certain. Officer Clements 
had conducted no field tests at the time, and he did not 
know if anybody else had. He explained technically how 
field tests are conducted. A field test, he explained, would 
have confirmed his initial "suspicions"; however, even 
without the field test, Clements had finally concluded based 
on his experience that one of the two substances was in 
fact "crack." 
 
As its last witness, the government called Detective 
Rodriguez. He had been with the narcotics division of the 
Philadelphia district attorney's office since 1988 and for 
four prior years was a city police officer in the major 
investigation division of the city's narcotics unit. In his 
police career, Detective Rodriguez estimated he had 
purchased "crack" over fifty times. He testified how, in an 
undercover capacity, he would discuss drug quality with 
drug sellers as well as how they turned cocaine into 
"crack." He described how "crack" was distributed on 
Philadelphia streets in packets, vials, and bundles. 
Furthermore, he described the distinguishing 
characteristics of cocaine and "crack." He had testified as a 
narcotics expert previously in federal court in excess of ten 
times. 
 
Detective Rodriguez had been present in court during the 
testimony of Corporal Donahue and Detective Clements. He 
testified that, based on their testimony and his experience, 
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the particular item referred to as being cocaine base would 
qualify as "crack" on the street. Rodriguez further testified 
that, in his experience, the only type of cocaine base sold 
in Philadelphia was "crack," although he had previously 
heard there was some other paste-like form of cocaine base 
prior to 1987. Rodriguez asserted that what he had heard 
described in the testimony could only be "crack," not any 
other form of cocaine base. On cross-examination he was 
unable, not being a chemist he explained, to answer some 
of the technical questions put to him. Rodriguez testified 
that although "crack" is sometimes contained in vials, none 
was so contained in this case as it was in bulk before being 
put into vials. Rodriguez testified that he did not know any 
of the details of Holman's case from first-hand experience 
as he had been directly involved in Holman's case only 
because the drug seizure was based on a wire intercept. 
 
That was generally the extent of the government's "crack" 
evidence. There was no contrary evidence. At the 
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court gave 
Holman the opportunity to speak, and he did. Holman 
advised the court, however, that the issues he was really 
interested in were the Guidelines' "safety valve" provision 
and the S 3B1.2 mitigating circumstances provision. We will 
consider those other issues briefly. Holman was given the 
chance but failed to deny or to say any thing whatsoever 




At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge found 
that Holman had possessed and had been involved in 
"crack" dealing. The district judge is an experienced trial 
judge who heard the evidence and observed the witnesses. 
The record reveals he kept the hearing focused on the 
"crack" issue and held the government to its full 
responsibilities under the standard of proof for sentencing. 
He criticized the government for not requiring the chemist 
personally to be present, but the chemist's report was 
introduced and was considered sufficient. The two police 
officers who testified were both very experienced in heroin 
and "crack" cases. One of them had been the officer who 
actually seized the drugs at Holman's apartment and 
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visually identified the "crack" based on his prior 
experiences. The cocaine and "crack" had been kept 
separate by Holman. There was little doubt considering the 
color, texture, and circumstances that the cocaine base was 
"crack." One hundred percent certainty is not required, nor 
is a precise chemical analysis necessary. United States v. 
Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 190 (3rd Cir. 1998)(citing Roman, 121 
F.3d at 141). In reviewing the district court's factual 
findings underlying application of the Guidelines, we apply 
the deferential clearly erroneous standard. United States v. 
Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151, 152-55 (3rd Cir. 1992). We will 
reverse only if, after reviewing the evidence, we are left with 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. Dent, 149 F.3d at 189. As we view the government's 
evidence, and there was none to the contrary, the district 
judge could only have found that "crack" was involved in 
sufficient quantity to justify the sentence enhancement. No 
clear error can be found in the district court's findings, nor 
is this a case of "barely enough" evidence to sustain the 
"crack" findings. See Roman, 121 F.3d at 140-41 (holding 
that evidence was sufficient to support a finding of "crack" 
when an experienced drug enforcement officer made a 
"crack" determination based solely on the manner in which 
the drugs were packaged). 
 
Holman also complains that the district court denied him 
a decrease in his offense level for his claimed mitigating role 
in the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2. He had 
participated in a large conspiracy, but he argues that his 
role in that conspiracy was minor. Section 3B1.2 provides 
a reduction in offense level for defendants who are minor or 
minimal participants in an offense. To be eligible for a 
deduction under S 3B1.2, "[t]he defendant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that other participants were involved and 
that," under the relevant standards and the facts of his 
particular case, "the minor role adjustment should apply." 
United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 240 (3rd Cir. 
1998). Holman fails to meet this burden. 
 
In Isaza-Zapata, the defendant was only a one-time 
courier, a "mule," hired in Columbia to transport heroin to 
the United States on one occasion. The government agreed 
that Isaza-Zapata was entitled to a downward adjustment. 
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Isaza-Zapata unsuccessfully attempted after his arrest to be 
of assistance to the government in locating the United 
States contact. In the present case, Holman has admitted 
to serving as a distributor in the conspiracy. He pled guilty 
to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The 
record shows that the total amount of cocaine distributed 
by the conspiracy during Holman's involvement wasfifty 
kilograms. Holman concedes that of this amount ten 
kilograms of cocaine can be attributed to him. The district 
court surely did not clearly err in determining that the 
distributor does not play a mitigating role in a conspiracy 
to distribute ten kilograms of cocaine. 
 
Holman was also particularly interested, he said, in the 
"safety valve" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
S 5C1.2, but that provision does not apply in view of the 
sentence he received. Section 5C1.2 is designed to allow the 
court to "impose a sentence in accordance with the 
applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory 
minimum sentence," if the court finds that the defendant 
fulfills five criteria. In the present case, the statutory 
mandatory minimum was 120 months. 21 U.S.C. S 841 
(a)(1). The district court determined that Holman's 
applicable guideline range was between 108 and 135 
months and sentenced Holman to 135 months. The record 
evidence shows that this sentence was made with 
consideration of the entire applicable guideline range and 
without regard to the statutory minimum sentence. Even if 
Holman had been able to show that he met the 
requirements of the safety valve provision, the provisions of 
S 5C1.2 would be of no help to him. 
 
Holman's final complaint is that he cooperated with the 
government and should have been given the sentencing 
benefit of a S 5K1.1 downward departure for his alleged 
help to the government. The government, however, found 
him to be of no help, explaining that Holman offered only 
general information which was of no government use. 
Holman did offer information about a particular person, but 
that person had already been taken into custody. 
Generally, a sentencing court may not depart below the 
guideline range based on a defendant's cooperation unless 
the government makes a motion to permit such a 
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departure. U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 ("Upon motion of the 
government stating that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance . . ., the court may depart from the 
guidelines."); see also United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 
206, 211-12 (3rd Cir. 1998). It is the government's 
prosecutorial decision whether or not to seek a downward 
departure under S 5K1.1 where a defendant claims to have 
been of assistance to the government. That is an executive 
branch discretionary decision ordinarily entitled to 
deference in these circumstances. United States v. Paramo, 
998 F.2d 1212, 1221 (3rd Cir. 1993). Federal courts do 
have the power to review a prosecutor's refusal tofile a 
S 5K1.1 motion and to grant a remedy, but only if the 
refusal was based on bad faith, if a plea agreement 
otherwise required the government to consider offering a 
S 5K1.1 departure motion, or on an unconstitutional 
motive. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d at 212. At oral argument, 
counsel for Holman conceded that he did not allege that the 
government acted either in bad faith or with an 
unconstitutional motive. Holman, therefore, is not entitled 
to a S 5K1.1 departure. 
 
Holman's assertions of trial court error all lack merit. 
Therefore, the district court is affirmed in respects. 
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